

Indonesia's fragmenting parliament: Implications of the 2014 elections

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Main issues


- Continuing DPR fragmentation from 1999 to 2014
- Proliferation of veto players in a consensus chamber
- Rise of the “presidential party” within a contradictory legal framework
- Apparent development of party coalitions – government vs opposition?
- Legislative obstruction or legislative incoherence?

Progressive fragmentation with increased no of parties

- 1999: 5 major parties
- 2004: 7 major parties
- 2009: 9 parties
- 2014: 10 parties
- Decreasing size of leading party
 - PDIP 33% (1999)
 - Golkar 23% (2004)
 - Democrat 26 % (2009)
 - PDIP 19% (2014)


Party composition of DPR: 1999-2004

5 major parties (% seats)




Party composition of DPR: 2004-2009

7 major parties (% seats)




Party composition of DPR: 2009-14

2009 - 9 parties (% seats)




Party composition of DPR: 2014-19

2014 DPR - 10 parties (% seats)




Declining size of "winning" party: 1999-2014

Largest party - 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014




Declining size of major parties: 1999-2014

Two largest parties - 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014



Declining size of major parties: 1999-2014

Three largest parties - 1999, 2004, 2009, 2014



Explanations for the fragmenting trend

1. Changing voter loyalty and behaviour
 - Voter identification with parties in decline
 - Increasing nos of “undecided” or “swinging” voters
 - Decline in intensity of *aliran* identity

Explanations..

2. Problems with party institutionalisation

- Lack of programmatic differentiation
- Internal incapacity to build internal coalitions
 - “winner takes all” attitude to party leadership – PDIP, Golkar, PKB splits, “presidential” parties (Democrat, Hanura, Gerindra, NasDem)
- Poor quality of party candidates
- Corruption, money politics, transactional politics

Explanations..

3. Constitutional and legislative factors – contradictory incentives


- Direct presidential election created two electoral spheres
- Incentive for presidential aspirants to found new parties – all post-2004 parties are “presidential” (Democrat, Hanura, Gerindra, NasDem)
- Incentive strengthened because presidential candidates must be supported by a party + exceed the DPR threshold for candidacy
- This has counteracted the effect of tighter party registration & parliamentary threshold of 3.5% - only “flea” parties eliminated

DPR decision-making process

- Bill is drafted – by Ministry or within DPR (Baleg)
- Formally accepted as a draft at a plenary session
- Assigned to relevant Commission for deliberation with Govt reps
- Special Committee formed by Commission to conduct deliberations
- Most detail discussed by a Working Committee (with Govt reps)
- Final draft decided by Special Committee
- Formally ratified by plenary – ceremonial only
- If no agreement by plenary, the bill is passed by voting

“Coalitions” in the DPR: overcoming fragmentation?

Koalisi Indonesia Hebat v. Koalisi Merah Putih



Overcoming fragmentation?

- One view sees formation of pro-Prabowo coalition moving towards organised party alliances
 - Better accountability for executive government (*Jakarta Globe* 11/11/14)
- Other view sees it as merely Prabowo's efforts to keep pressure on Jokowi and stay in the political game – view to 2019?
 - Kept together by Prabowo's money – who will follow PPP out?
- Repeat of 2004 “coalitions”? – National Coalition v People's Coalition
 - Largely about control of DPR Commissions
 - Coalitions collapsed when Kalla won control of Golkar

Overcoming fragmentation?

- Tentative signs of trend towards opposition and government
- PDIP learnt from 1999-2009 that opposition can bring benefits
- But key is behaviour of parties in DPR Commissions & other committees

Commissions and consensus

- Commissions are the site of greatest fragmentation & unpredictability
 - Individualistic, transactional politics under weak party discipline
 - Policy input from party members is personalised, not programmatic
 - Consensus (mukafat) decisions rarely reflect party positions
- More coalition-based discipline & predictability in Commissions?
- Will there be more votes in plenary sessions?

The new dynamics in action?: Changes to DPR rules (DP3)

- On Pres election day, Merah Putih pushed through DPR rules changes in Law on Legislatures (DP3)
- Changed rules for investigation of MPs – President must agree
- Abolished Public Accounts Committee (BAKN)
- Modified *dana aspirasi* – MPs could “suggest” spending measures
- Changed rules for election of Speaker & Commission Chairs
 - Previously Speaker taken by largest party
 - Commission Chairs in proportion to party strength
 - New rules say “satu paket” to be voted on if no *mufakat* reached
- Under the new rules, Merah Putih took all leadership positions
 - Speaker, Deputy Speaker, Chair/Vice-Chair Commissions & other bodies

Koalisi Merah Putih: DPR Commission Chair/Vice-Chairs

	Golkar	Gerindra	Democrat	PAN	PKS
Chair	3	3	2	2	1
Vice Chairs	9	7	7	5	5
Total	12	10	9	7	6

Koalisi Merah Putih: Commission Chairs by Party

PARTY	COMMISSION
Golkar	KI Foreign Affairs, Defence, Intelligence
	KII Home Affairs
	KXI Finance, Banking
Gerindra	KIV Forestry, Fishing, Agriculture
	KV Public Works, Housing, Communications
	KVII Energy, Minerals
PAN	KVI Trade, BUMN
	KVIII Religion, Social, Women
Democrat	KIX Health, Labour
	KX Education, Sport, Youth

Indonesia Hebat's response & compromise deal

- Indonesia Hebat boycotted sessions
- Appointed their own leadership profile
- Boycott would prevent hearings with Govt representatives (quorum)
- Compromise deal reached
 - 16 new Deputy Chair positions (11 Commissions + 5 other bodies)
 - No new Vice Speaker position
- Amendment to UU MD3 required – how will this be framed?

Conclusion

- 2014 continuing trend to fragmentation
- Caused by voters' response to poor party performance & lack of institutionalisation
- Encouraged by presidential system & electoral laws
- Could worsen unpredictable decision-making
- But will coalition-building lead to clearly defined opposition?
- Obstructionism or unpredictability? Or maturation?