



The Army and the Indonesian Genocide

Mechanics of Mass Murder

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20 years since *reformasi*

- *Reformasi*- hopes and expectations
 - 1999 Human Rights Law
 - 2000 Human Rights Courts Law
 - 2004 TRC Law
 - “G30S/PKI”
- Backlash begins
- 2008- 2012 Komnas HAM investigation
- 2018: A new non-judicial approach?



Map of Indonesia





- Provincial Capital
- Other Towns
- ▭ District Boundaries

Note: Simeulue, Sabang, Lhokseumawe, and Langsa all have district status.

Note: Map boundaries and locations are approximate. Geographic features and their names do not imply official endorsement or recognition by the UN.

The question of military agency

- What role did the military play in the 1965-66 killings?
- Is it possible to prove military agency behind the killings?
- Were the killings implemented as a centralized national campaign?



Denial of the genocide

- The killings depicted by the military as a “spontaneous” uprising by “the people”
- Pretext for this campaign, actions of the 30 September Movement
- “The West’s best news for years in Asia”, *TIME*, 6 July 1966



How has the genocide been explained?

The military “encouraged” armed mobs “to take advantage of [the] anti-PKI climate...”

-Lucien Rey, 1966

“The Army clearly intended to destroy the party root and branch... the PKI was rapidly rounded up and destroyed” with the assistance of military-trained vigilante groups

-Ruth McVey and Benedict Anderson, 1971




“[Although] the simplest way of explaining the mass killings is to charge the Army with having used its near-monopoly of the means of violence to kill the communists... It would be difficult to prove that the massacre was planned by Soeharto and the officers supporting him, or even to argue that they stood in an way to gain from it.”

- Killings carried out by “Muslims” and “villagers” whom the military were unable to “stop”.

In Aceh: “Acehnese is a frenzy of *jihad* set out to kill the communists in Aceh... [Aceh’s Military Commander] General Ishak Djuarsa attempted to limit the mass slaughter.”


-Ulf Sundhaussen, *The Road to Power*, 1982

Alternative narratives/ major breakthroughs



- Major outstanding question: Were the killings spontaneous or part of coordinated campaign?
- Did the military produce and send formal written orders? (Crouch, 1978), Were systematic records kept of the killings? (Cribb, 2010)

What is it now possible to know?



The Indonesian genocide files

1 October 1965

Key orders:

- Morning of 1 October: “A Coup movement has occurred” (Suharto)/ “Await further orders/ instructions from the Panglatu [Mokoginta]” (Mokoginta)
- **9pm 1 October: “We have the regions under our control”**
- Midnight 1 October: “It is ordered... all members of the Armed Forces *resolutely and completely annihilate* this counter-revolution” (Mokoginta)
- New Defense Region Command (Kohanda) and ‘Operasi Berdikari’ is activated



Initial coordination

- Initial military and government coordination meetings held throughout province
- Military's Annihilation campaign adopted by Civilian Government
- On 4 October: military orders civilians to "assist" the military "in every attempt to completely annihilate the Counter Revolutionary 30 September Movement"




- Djuarsa embarks on coordination tour throughout province
- At public meetings civilian population issued with ultimatum by Djuarsa, 'Kill the PKI or you will be targeted'





The spread of public violence

- Demonstrations develop into pogrom actions from 7 October and spread throughout province
- Violence portrayed as “spontaneous” but meticulously recorded by military
- 1,941 recorded by military as killed during this period
- Military arrest campaign



" PERKILAHAN/PERKILAHAN "

Dengan nama Allah yang Maha Perkasa dan Maha Jujur serta
 nama kepada Djajidjurnan kita Ubi Meor Mahamad s.s.w.

Perkataan ini adalah tentang hal-hal yang telah terjadi di Aceh
 dan ini adalah tentang hal-hal yang telah terjadi di Aceh
 dan ini adalah tentang hal-hal yang telah terjadi di Aceh

1. J.M. Man./Zaman/ Let. Dand. Ahmad Jani
2. Daud II Man./Daud II Man./Daud II Man.
3. Daud III Man./Daud III Man./Daud III Man.
4. Anas I Man./Anas I Man./Anas I Man.
5. Anas II Man./Anas II Man./Anas II Man.
6. Anas III Man./Anas III Man./Anas III Man.
7. Anas IV Man./Anas IV Man./Anas IV Man.

... dan ini adalah tentang hal-hal yang telah terjadi di Aceh

PERKILAHAN/PERKILAHAN

... dan ini adalah tentang hal-hal yang telah terjadi di Aceh

PERKILAHAN/PERKILAHAN

... dan ini adalah tentang hal-hal yang telah terjadi di Aceh

PERKILAHAN/PERKILAHAN

... dan ini adalah tentang hal-hal yang telah terjadi di Aceh

2. Surat perintah yang dikeluarkan oleh...
 3. Mengingat bahwa...
PERKILAHAN/PERKILAHAN
 14. Surat...
 15. Surat...
 16. Surat...
PERKILAHAN/PERKILAHAN
PERKILAHAN/PERKILAHAN
PERKILAHAN/PERKILAHAN
 1. Surat...
 2. Surat...
 3. Surat...
 4. Surat...
 5. Surat...
 6. Surat...

Lampiran, 14 Oktober 1969.
 Atas nama Rakyat Aceh Timur.
PERKILAHAN/PERKILAHAN

1. Surat...
 2. Surat...
 3. Surat...
 4. Surat...
 5. Surat...
 6. Surat...

FORMATION OF DEATH SQUADS

Founding document of the Pantja Sila Defence Front, East Aceh

16. Tjot Gireh Hoesaren
17. Elang Pulo Tjunda
18. Geulanggang Labu Mtg. Glp. dua
19. Tjot Gapu Birouen
20. Tambue Samalanga

PERSENDJAJATAN :

Dalam rangka pembersihan/penumpasan G 30 S kepada Anggota Hansip/Hanra Sektor IV Atjeh Utara oleh Kosekhan Atjeh Utara untuk keperluan itu telah membagi-bagikan sendjata ke- Daerah2 Sub Sektor Hansip/Hanra yang dianggap perlu adalah :

- a. Sub Sektor Seunuddon 9 putjuk L.E.+ 1 putjuk Sten,
- b. Sub Sektor Samalanga 16 putjuk L.E.
- c. Sub Sektor Djeumpa Birouen 1 putjuk Garand + 1 Putjuk LE.
- d. Kantor Pemerintah Daerah di lhoseumawe 9 putjuk L.E.+ 1 putjuk Sten,
- e. Kantor Vital (Bai Unit II, III) 9 putjuk L.E.+ 1 putjuk Sten.

WEAPONS DISTRIBUTED

Rifles and machine guns distributed to civilian paramilitary groups

Direct military involvement in the violence

- Mass killings begin throughout province once detainee populations in military jails reach critical mass
- Detainees transported to military controlled killing sites on trucks
- Killed by military or other appointed executioners



Creation of military “War Room”

- 14 October: Djuarsa issued an Instruction *“establishing the creation of a RUANG YUDHA (War Room) for [all] military units”*
- The War Room *“enabled KODAM I to carryout NON-CONVENTIONAL war in accordance with the Concept of Territorial Warfare [and enabled it to] succeed in annihilating them [“GESTOK”] together with the people...”* (emphasis in original)



A centralised national campaign?

- Is this information relevant only to Aceh?
- How were the killings coordinated nationally?

Commander of the Armed Forces
(Pangad)
Yani

Military Region Command
(Kodam)

Strategic Command
(Kostrad)
Suharto

Special Forces
(RPKAD)
Wibowo

Special Operations Command
(KOTI)
Dhani



Commander of the Armed Forces
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Military Region Command
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Strategic Command
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Special Forces
(RPKAD)
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Commander of the Armed Forces
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Suharto


Military Region Command
(Kodam)

Strategic Command
(Kostrad)
Suharto

Special Forces
(RPKAD)
Wibowo

Special Operations Command
(KOTI)
Suharto

Operation Command for the
Restoration of Security and Order
(KOPKAMTIB)
Suharto



Oct 1967

Dec 1965

1 Nov 1965

What is it now possible to know?

- There is clear evidence of military agency behind the killings
- The military described the killings as an “Annihilation Operation”
- The military ordered civilians to participate in this campaign
- The military established and armed death squads and civilian militia groups to help implement the killings
- The killings were initiated and implemented by the military as a centralized, national campaign

